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Abstract
This article examines Ulysses S. Grant’s command of the Union army after receiving his commission as
Lieutenant-General through analyzing his decisions both before and during the bloody battle of Cold
Harbor. By examining the various factors leading to his tactical decisions, including the ever-looming
threat of the upcoming presidential election, the article questions whether or not his reputation as a
butcher of his own men is truly deserved. That he made mistakes is undeniable, but the mess of Cold
Harbor was not solely his fault. Through the use of a variety of biographies and personal journals and
memoirs, the article points out the perfect storm of mistakes both on Grant’s part and that of his
commanders, the pressure being faced from higher up in the chain of command, the horrible weather and
conditions of the army, and the fact that Lee simply took advantage of every opportunity he was
presented with.
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Heaven Hung in Black
HEAVEN HUNG IN BLACK:
GRANT’S REPUTATION AND THE MISTAKES AT
COLD HARBOR
Samantha Kramer | Washington & Jefferson College
When Ulysses S. Grant received his commission as
Lieutenant-General on March 9, 1864, not only did he gain
control over the entire Union Army, but was also subjected
to mounting pressure from the White House to end the war
as quickly as possible. It was an election year, and if Lincoln
wanted any chance of winning re-nomination from his party,
decisive victories on the battlefield were needed. With antiwar sentiment growing in the North, it was necessary to
demonstrate that the war was at its end and that the
Confederacy was on the brink of destruction. This would
prove easier said than done; it took massive coordination to
move the army in unison, the destruction of Georgia under
Sherman, a long siege that left Richmond struggling to
survive, and some of the bloodiest warfare yet to finally
force Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in April 1865.
It was the beginning of this grand offensive that
caused contemporaries as well as historians to label Grant a
butcher of his own men. Weeks of fighting during the
Overland Campaign culminated in the disastrous assault on
Cold Harbor, which left nearly five Union soldiers for every
Confederate. Cold Harbor was undoubtedly Grant’s worst
defeat, but to pretend that the casualties were his intention or
that he was indifferent to how many men he lost so long as
he gained something in the end is unjust. To do so would
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ignore the various factors leading to the battle, reducing a
grand strategy to bloodlust over errors made by multiple
parties. Grant did not set out to butcher his men, but in his
desperation to end the war as soon as possible, his mistakes
led to the deaths of the very men he was trying to save.
The Grand Offensive
When Grant stepped in as commander of the Union forces,
he gained an army with a struggling chain of command, little
coordination between the various divisions spread around
the country, and an Eastern Theater with terrain that made
any sort of troop movement a difficult and time-consuming
affair. After his decisive victories in the Western Theater,
Grant realized that if the army moved along three fronts at
once, relentlessly pushing forward and keeping Lee’s forces
on the defensive, the Union could act as a noose locking the
remaining Confederate Army in place and slowly strangling
it into submission. By 1864, the goal was no longer to settle
the war through large victories and force the Confederacy to
surrender, but the complete destruction and capture of Lee’s
forces. Grant had seen too many battles in which
commanders failed to give chase immediately after a victory,
allowing Confederates to reorganize, lick their wounds, and
settle into strong defensive positions that would push back
the Union soldiers eventually sent after them. He was
determined not to repeat these mistakes, preferring
aggressive, continual assaults.
Equally central to Grant’s strategy were flanking
maneuvers designed to cut off communications and destroy
supply lines. Virginia’s food supplies were exhausted at this
70
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point in the war, forcing it to rely on supplies from Alabama,
Georgia, and the Carolinas. 1 As part of his offensive,
Sherman and his men would advance from their position in
Chattanooga and eliminate Albert Sidney Johnston’s army
near Dalton, Georgia before pressing forward to occupy
Atlanta. 2 By capturing Atlanta and moving north through the
Carolinas, Sherman would destroy the supplies necessary to
sustain the Confederate war effort. He would also prevent
Lee’s army from fleeing further south to avoid the Army of
the Potomac under Grant and George Meade, thus trapping
them in place.
However, Grant was limited in how he could execute
the northern prong of the Overland Campaign due to the
proximity of Lee’s army to Washington. The city had
already come under attack twice in the previous years, and it
would be disastrous for another attack to take place in an
election year. The river systems of Virginia presented other
obstacles, serving as defensive lines for Lee to hide behind
as well as forcing the Union army to either work around them
or find its way across them. The country was also heavily
forested, and the roads narrow and poorly kept. 3 The army
itself had issues as well, especially in the chain of command.
General Meade was unpopular with his officers, but was the
hero of Gettysburg. Benjamin Butler lacked military ability,
but wielded political influence. Ambrose Burnside also had
political influence, but refused to serve under Meade and
James Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander (New York:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), 136.
2
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 134.
3
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 136.
1
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therefore acted as an independent entity rather than a reserve
for Meade’s army. Franz Sigel lacked military ability as
well, but his appointment had helped ensure that German
settlers in St. Louis would vote for Lincoln. 4 Short of one of
these men causing a serious mistake on the battlefield, Grant
was virtually powerless to replace them with more
competent commanders. So instead, he decided to rule his
subordinates with an iron fist, instructing them to come
straight to him during battle and to follow his instructions
rather than their own whims.
Too many mistakes had been made in earlier battles
on the part of flakey commanders, and Grant was keen that
they not be repeated in the future. He told his officers the
following:
I want you to discuss with me freely from time to
time the details of the orders given for the conduct of
a battle, and learn my views as fully as possible as to
what course should be pursued in all the contingencies which may arise. I expect to send you to the
critical points of the lines to keep me promptly
advised of what is taking place, and in cases of great
emergency, when new dispositions have to be made
on the instant, or it becomes suddenly necessary to
reinforce on command by sending to its aid troops
from another, and there is not time to communicate
with headquarters, I want you to explain my views to
commanders, and urge immediate action, looking to
4

Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 137.
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cooperation, without waiting for specific orders from
me. 5
By early April 1864, each of Grant’s commanders were
given instructions for the imminent campaign. These
instructions outlined separate directives and alternative
plans that could be implemented based on further discussion
with Grant or in case of emergency. Butler and Meade were
ordered to move out against Lee’s forces on May 4, while
Sherman was to move his 100,000 men against Johnston the
next day. 6 There would be no slowing down or turning back
for “Unconditional Surrender” Grant.
Critics of Grant’s methods in the first month of the
Overland Campaign often point out that other plans could
have been implemented to prevent the bloodshed. But Grant
was simply going off the information available at the time in
order to make the most tactically sound decisions. In his
biography of Grant, James Marshall-Cornwell argues that it
might have been more effective to weaken the Confederate
economy with a naval blockade and force a surrender
through civilian pressure, reminiscent of Winfield Scott’s
famed Anaconda Plan. This position would have been
strengthened with the Union’s control of the Mississippi,
which Grant had already one during his campaigns in the
West. 7 But such a blockade would have taken time that Grant
did not have to bargain with. Moreover, a stronger blockade
Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant (New York: Century, 1897),
38.
6
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 139.
7
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 137.
5
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against Southern exports would have increased pressure on
Great Britain and France, both of which relied on Southern
cotton for their textile industries, to finally cave and support
the Confederacy.
Marshall-Conway also argues that the casualties at
the Battle of the Wilderness could have been avoided had
Grant “handled [General Philip H.] Sheridan’s Cavalry
Corps with more imagination,” and that, “had Grant pushed
on rapidly to Spotsylvania through the Wilderness on the
evening of 4 May… he would have beaten Lee in the race
for Richmond, and would have been able to fight him with
superior numbers in more open country.” 8 Sheridan’s
Cavalry Corps was a relatively recent invention; Grant had
formed them earlier in March in response to the lack of
coordination within Union cavalry units, who up to that point
had primarily acted as independent side-line fighters. The
Wilderness was the first test for the corps as a whole, so
Grant’s choice to put these men straight into the thick of
things can be construed as a suicidal waste of both men and
horses. Yet of all that battles that Grant fought in the Overland Campaign, it is Cold Harbor that his critics point to as
proof of his butcher-like brutality. Lieutenant-Colonel
Martin Thomas McMahon, writing a few years later in a
collection of first-hand war accounts, opens his criticism of
the battle with the following:
In the opinion of a majority of its survivors, the battle
of Cold Harbor should never have been fought. There
8

Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 154.
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was no military reason to justify it. It was the dreary,
dismal, bloody, ineffective close of the LieutenantGeneral’s first campaign with the Army of the
Potomac, and correspond in all its essential features
with what had preceded it. 9
It certainly does Grant no favors that this battle came
at the end of nearly an entire month of bloody fighting, with
heavy Union losses at both the Wilderness and Spotsylvania
and the month’s total casualties numbering over 60,000. 10
By Cold Harbor, the army was exhausted from constant
fighting and marching, and another battle did nothing to help
the matter. Artillerist Charles Wainwright wrote in his
journal, “I fear that the truth is that all the fight is gone out
of our men. Grant has used the army up, and will now have
to wait until its morale is restored before he can do
anything.” 11 This exhaustion caused delays in arrival for
certain units, and forced Grant to repeatedly push back the
assault, which historian Brooks Simpson has called “nothing
short of stupid.” 12 But if Grant had pushed forward and
ignored his men, the soldiers would not have had time to rest
after marching, and the commanders would have struggled
to organize the assault.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, eds. Robert Underwood Johnson
and Clarence Clough Buel, vol. 4 (New York: Century, 1888), 231.
10
Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4:171.
11
A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S.
Wainwright, 1861-1865, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, 1962), 431.
12
Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 18221865 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 325.
9
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Once the assault was over, the controversy was not.
The dead, trapped between the two lines, were left to rot
among the wounded due to the fact that Grant and Lee could
not agree to a ceasefire and were unable to be retrieved.
Ernest Furgurson, who was not satisfied with other authors’
criticisms of Grant, opened his book on Cold Harbor by
referencing these abandoned men:
Never before and never again in the American Civil
War were so many wounded soldiers left so long to
suffer in plain sight of their comrades, their enemies,
and the birds of carrion. Never did generals so
blatantly place concern for their own reputations
above mercy for their soldiers lying dying in the
sun. 13
Grant was not solely to blame in this instance, but it has still
been used to bolster claims that he was a butcher. Grant may
have worded his letters to Lee differently, and maybe that
would have shortened the time he took to communicate. But
perhaps Lee still would have still stuck to his militaristic
formality and the discussions would have taken just as long.
Certainly some of these criticisms are valid. Still, Cold
Harbor was a perfect storm of mistakes on the part of both
Grant and his commanders, pressure from higher up forcing
Grant onward, horrible weather, and Lee taking advantage
of every tactical opportunity presented him.
Ernest B. Furgurson, Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor 1864 (New
York: Random House, 2001), 3.
13
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The Assault on Cold Harbor
While the fighting at Cold Harbor lasted from May 31 to
June 12, it is the disastrous assault on June 3 that newspapers
at the time and historians today point to for their charges of
butchery. Yet the events of the days prior are what led to the
bloody mess between the lines. Sheridan’s Cavalry Corps
first seized the crossroads at Cold Harbor on May 31, and
were ordered to hold it at all costs despite counterattacks
from Confederate forces under Robert Hoke. Union
reinforcements were on their way from the 6th Corps under
Horatio Wright, but in order to have them arrive on time,
they were forced to march for fifteen miles through the
night. 14 As the fighting continued into the next morning on
June 1, Sheridan’s forced held out for four hours until
Wright’s men arrived at 9 a.m. 15
Meanwhile, William Farrar Smith’s 18th Corps,
which has sat inactive since May 16, was ordered by Grant’s
chief of staff John Aaron Rawlins to move his men toward
New Castle Ferry. But when they arrived, they discovered
that Rawlins had made a fatal error: he sent them to the
wrong location. They were eight miles away, and men
dropped from heat exhaustion as the unit turned around to
make it in time for battle. They had no ammunition, but still
attacked when they arrived at 5 p.m. and even managed to
carry the first line of Confederate rifle pits with the 6th
Corps. 16 Though this fighting on June 1 inflicted losses of
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 173.
Ron Chernow, Grant (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 402.
16
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 174.
14
15
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more than two thousand men between the two units, Union
forces managed to gain control of the roads to the James
River as well as key tactical ground, which the rebels failed
to take back in subsequent skirmishes. 17
As Grant and his staff set up their headquarters at
Bethesda church, the plan for the following days started to
take form. One of the primary concerns at this point was
encountering the rebels after they had already entrenched
themselves, which had been a continual problem during the
campaign. Accordingly, Grant wanted to move forward as
early as possible on June 2 to reach Confederate forces
before they had time to settle in. The subsequent battle was
intended to roll up the Confederate right flank and drive a
wedge between Lee and the Chickahominy River, with a
main thrust by the 18th, 6th, and 2nd Corps while the 9th and
5th would wheel up, flank the rebels, and destroy their
formations.
All five corps were on the line on June 2, but not on
time or in shape for the planned assault at five p.m. Winfield
Scott Hancock, with farther to march than other units, was
late to take his position on the left. Smith had struggled
mightily to arrive, and lacked the ammunition to be effective
in an assault. Perhaps remembering earlier battles such as the
Wilderness, where simply allowing units to fight when they
arrived led to confusion and destruction, Grant decided on
the fatal delay to allow his units time to prepare themselves
before the assault. He also made an uncharacteristic
judgment of Meade’s military ability, entrusting him with
17

Chernow, Grant, 402.
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the next day’s assault. He also moved Wright’s corps to the
left, hoping to take advantage of what he saw as a weak spot
in the Confederate line. 18 As Grant later wrote in his
memoirs,
Before the removal of Wright’s corps from our right,
after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and
Confederate, were so close together at that point that
either side could detect directly any movement made
by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left
his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to
our left. 19
Not only had Lee taken advantage of the evident delay in
hostilities and entrenched his men on their side of the
battlefield; he was also quick to adjust his forces and follow
the movements that Grant had failed to disguise.
Veteran soldiers had witnessed enough bloodshed to
recognize the chaos about to unfold. Horace Porter, one of
Grant’s staff officers, was delivering orders when he noticed
a rather peculiar sight:
As I came near one of the regiments which was
making preparations for the next morning’s assault,
I noticed that many of the soldiers had taken off their
coats… it was found that the men were calmly
Jean Edward Smith, Grant (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 361.
Ulysses S. Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant
(Lexington, KY: ReadaClassic, 2010), 348.
18
19
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writing their names and home addresses on slips of
paper, and pinning them on the backs of their coats,
so that their dead bodies might be recognized upon
the field, and their fate made known to their families
at home. 20
At 4:30 on the morning on June 3, the units under Hancock,
Wright, and Smith dashed forward to strike at the center and
right-center of the Confederate defenses. This was the
battle’s largest body of troops exposed to heavy firepower,
as Confederate artillery and infantry fired round after round
into the approaching Union soldiers. One survivor referred
to it as having “the fury of the Wilderness musketry with the
thunder of the Gettysburg artillery superadded.” 21 Many
soldiers were forced to use the corpses of their comrades in
defense against the storm of bullets. 22
As Grant responded to dispatches at headquarters,
Meade continued to give shaky and contradictory orders to
his subordinates, unsure of whether to continue the assault.
At 11 a.m., Grant arrived on the front to witness the disaster
before him. Furious, and realizing that Meade had lost
control, he managed to call an end to the battle at 12:30 p.m.,
but both sides continued shelling out relentless artillery fire
for the next several days. 23 The assault on Cold Harbor was
over, at the cost of 1,500 Confederate lives and nearly five

Porter, Campaigning with Grant, 171.
Smith, Grant, 362.
22
Chernow, Grant, 404.
23
Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant, 368.
20
21
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times as many Union. 24 Yet according to official War
Department figures, Cold Harbor was not even the deadliest
battle in the Overland Campaign, with a loss of 10,058
killed, wounded, or missing compared with the Wilderness’
13,948 and Spotsylvania’s 13,601. In total, from the first day
of the Wilderness on May 5 to the end of negotiations at Cold
Harbor on June 12, Union losses numbered 39,259. 25 But
unliked these other battles, both of which forced the rebel
army to retreat and the Union to gain critical tactical ground,
nothing was gained to make up for the losses sustained.
Causes of Disaster
While at a surface glance Cold Harbor seems like nothing
but an utter strategic failure on Grant’s part, the causes of the
disaster were not so simple. The Overland Campaign, which
had started four weeks earlier, was unprecedented in
American military history. At no point up to that time had
there ever been two armies on US soil continuously fighting
once another for such a length of time. Grant was worried
that this battle could be the last time he had Lee out in the
open and away from Richmond’s defenses, and was
determined to inflict a significant blow on rebel forces.
Grant, like those in Washington, did not a want a prolonged
siege of the Confederate capital. The political pressure he
faced certainly did not help the matter. While Union forces
had been gaining ground, many on Lincoln’s staff wanted
Grant to take Richmond as soon as possible, even as the
24
25

Chernow, Grant, 405.
Smith, Grant, 365.
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bloody fighting showed that this would take longer than
expected. According to some figures, the war was costing
the Union $4 million per day. 26 So Grant felt forced to
continue fighting, to continue moving, to continue taking
ground in order to keep Lincoln from losing the election.
However, by the time of Cold Harbor, soldiers as
well as commanders were completely exhausted. The
weather compounded their fatigue, as Union soldiers in their
wool uniforms were unaccustomed to the sheer heat and
dustiness of Virginia summers. Lee’s men also had the
benefit of familiar terrain where they lived, traveled, and
fought, while Grant was looking at terra incognita. The
Confederate position enjoyed some natural strengths as well:
the right flank was covered by the valley of the
Chickahominy and the left flank rested on Totopotomoy
Creek. The ground, although level, was covered in swamps,
gullies, and thickets that limited the movement of
approaching soldiers. 27 Lee took advantage of the delay that
Grant took to entrench his forces, creating a seven-mile front
of interlocking trenches supported by artillery. Horace Porter
later recalled:
I have never before seen such extensive works
constructed with such magical rapidity… They are
intricate, zig-zagged lined within lines, lines
protecting flank of lines, lines built to enfilade an
opposing line, lines within which lies a battery which
26
27

Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 171.
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 172.
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must keep silent… a maze and labyrinth of works
within works, and works without works, each laid out
with some definite design either of defense or
offense. 28
Confederate defenses were impregnable, and allowed rebel
forces to use their infantry and artillery in conjunction to
form the deadly volley of fire that some compared to the
sound of an erupting volcano.
The failures of Grant’s subordinates to cooperate or
give effective orders had just as strong an effect as his own
decisions or Lee’s position. By June 2, the Union command
structure was collapsing. Gouverneur K. Warren was
fighting with those below him, Meade and Burnside had
ceased communicating with one another like schoolchildren
(which led to Burnside refusing to send Meade
reinforcements), and Smith was still angry that Meade
refused to help him with ammunition. Meade also left his
corps commanders to plan their own advances, resulting in a
lack of coordination within the columns and failure to
undertake crucial reconnaissance. 29 When he did bother to
give orders, they did not list the time they were intended to
be carried out and lacked clear objectives or battlefield
boundaries. One of his orders to Smith, which was received
not long after midnight on June 2, vaguely read, “You will
make your dispositions to attack tomorrow morning on
General Wright’s right, and in conjunction with that officer’s
28
29

Porter, Campaigning with Grant, 159.
Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant, 324.
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attack. This attack should be made with your whole force
and as vigorously as possible.” 30 And in the heat of battle on
June 3, Meade failed again to issue effective orders, ignoring
logistics in favor of throwing men into the assault—the exact
charge that critics blame Grant for. In his account of the
battle a few years later, Smith recalled that
Later in the day I received a verbal order from
General Meade to make another assault, and that
order I refused to obey. I had carefully examined the
entire front of my line, and was convinced that no
assault could succeed that did not embrace a portion
of the works in ‘front of my right,’ where I was
powerless to make an attack. An assault under such
conditions I looked on as involving a wanton waste
of life. 31
Even after it was clear that his attack was a failure,
Meade considered renewing the assault. But rather than
making the decision for himself and asking Grant for his
opinion, Meade left it up to his subordinates to decide
whether to continue. Wright and Smith both told Meade that
their decision relied on that of others, and when Meade gave
orders for them to attack independently of one another, both
units remained in place rather than advancing. Grant made a
mistake in trusting Meade, but he should not be blamed for
Meade’s incompetence. Meade has been placed in charge of
30
31

Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 174.
Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4:227.
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the Army of the Potomac, and should have known his own
limitations as a commander.
Grant’s reputation was not helped by the fact that the
dead and wounded and lay trapped between the lines, but this
was due to Lee’s strict adherence to military protocol rather
than any butcher-like mentality on Grant’s part. Most of the
dead, as the numbers clearly demonstrate, were Union men.
But the firing did not calm down enough for a ceasefire to
even be considered until June 5. Grant, recognizing an
opportunity to help his dead and wounded men, immediately
wrote to Lee to request permission for unarmed men to
gather them during a ceasefire:
It is reported to me that there are wounded men,
probably of both armies, now lying exposed and
suffering between the lines occupied respectively by
the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some
provision should be made to provide against such
hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter,
when no battle is raging, either party be authorized
to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish
lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their
dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the
other party. Any other method, equally fair to both
parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired
will be accepted by me. 32

32

Grant, Personal Memoirs, 351.
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Yet when Lee’s reply came the next day, it seemed that
militaristic formality would be prioritized over humanity. He
shot down Grant’s request, saying that casualties should only
be moved under a flag of truce. When Grant promised that
stretcher-bearers would be waving white flags, this was not
enough for the Confederate commander: he wanted Grant to
send a flag of truce in order to request permission for a flag
of truce. 33 It took until the evening of June 6 for Lee to accept
Grant’s plan. He allowed orderlies to be sent out from 8 p.m.
to 10 p.m., in a manner nearly identical to the method that
Grant had initially proposed, but the time had already passed
when Union headquarters received Lee’s letter near
midnight. By the time Grant was finally able to get the
bodies off the battlefield on June 7, all but two of the
wounded had perished. 34
If Grant had been a senseless butcher, as those who
point to Cold Harbor would have it, he would not have cared
for the suffering of his men who laid dying, or showed regret
for his actions. But he did. Captain Samuel H. Beckwith
recalled Grant’s depression following the battle, telling him
that “the hardest part of this General business is the
responsibility for the loss of one’s men. I can see no other
way out of it, however; we’ve got to keep at them. But it is
hard, very hard, to see all those brave fellows killed and
wounded. It means aching hearts back home.” 35
Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant, 328.
Chernow, Grant, 407.
35
Samuel H. Beckwith, “With Grant in the Wilderness, By His
‘Shadow’; Chief Cipher Operator Samuel H. Beckwith, Who Was So
Constantly in Attendance Upon the Union General as to Earn That
33
34
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Other commanders and members of Grant’s staff
report similar encounters in the days after the battle. In his
own memoirs, where it must have taken great courage to
admit his feelings and failures to the public in such a candid
manner, he wrote,
I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold
Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of
the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At
Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to
compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed,
the advantages other than those of relative losses,
were on the Confederate side. 36
Grant accepted the blame put upon him for the casualties at
Cold Harbor, even if he was not entirely to blame. And if he
were such a barbaric commander, he would have paid no
heed to the exhaustion and poor conditions of his men. He
recognized how his men were suffering when they arrived,
and in order to help them, ironically ordered the delay that
would kill so many of them.
Likewise, if Grant were a senseless murderer, he
likely would have pressed forward with the attack without
delay. While this would have prevented Lee from strengthening his left or building his maze of trenches, Smith’s men
would have had no ammunition, and the soldiers would have
Nickname, Reminisces of That Historic Battle,” The New York Times,
May 31, 1914.
36
Grant, Personal Memoirs, 353.
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had been in no condition to fight. Moreover, Cold Harbor
was not even as great a defeat as critics try to suggest.
Historians such as J. F. C. Fuller and Bruce Catton point out
that Grant’s armies actually lost smaller percentages of their
men in battle when compared with other Civil War generals,
and the losses at Cold Harbor were similar in number to
other battles such as Gettysburg. 37 While these losses appear
larger because the Confederates lost so little and held their
ground, the battle was still in keeping with the objectives of
the Overland Campaign. Lee’s forces were unable to go on
the offensive at Cold Harbor, and the continual fighting that
followed forced their retreat to Richmond, allowing them to
be sieged and eventually to surrender at Appomattox.

37

Chernow, Grant, 407.
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